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The Kunsman case was decided in 1936. The holdings of the South Carolina
Supreme Court 25 and of other supreme courts26 declaring the Fair Trade Act un-
constitutional are more recent. However, in 1955, the California Supreme Court
was again confronted with a similar case regarding the Fair Trade Act.2 While
noting that several states had held these acts unconstitutional, the court reaffirmed
the position that was taken in the Kunsman case and aligned itself with the ma-
jority of state supreme courts and the federal courts. The court said:
"the statute has been the established law of the state for nearly twenty years and in
the orderly administration should be deemed controlling until otherwise provided by
duly enacted legislation."28
The positions taken by the South Carolina and California Supreme Courts are
generally representative of those taken by other courts that have decided this con-
stitutional question. The result reached by the South Carolina Court29 is that the
general welfare of the people is not benefited by restricting competition on the
retail level. The court felt that the act imposes an unwarranted burden upon a
fundamental concept of free enterprise. On the other hand, the California Supreme
Court reaches an opposite conclusion. 0 Its feeling is that there are certain retail
marketing practises that are so detrimental to the public interest that they require
governmental intervention. The Fair Trade Act prevents these evils and still
allows "fair and open" competition on the retail level.
The future of Fair Trade legislation is uncertain. Statutes that were passed
twenty years ago to aid fair trade on the retail level are now being struck down
as instruments of unfair trade. Perhaps the marketing evils they were supposed
to prevent no longer exist or are not present in a period of economic expansion.
At any rate, court decisions during the past five years have strongly indicated
that Fair Trade Acts are not acceptable in their present form and unless they are
changed they will be struck down.
Gerald B. Parent
WILLS: LEGACY OR DEVISE TO A CREDITOR
A owes B $100. When A dies there is a provision in his will bequeathing a
$100 legacy to his creditor B. Can B as a creditor-legatee take his benefits under
A's will and in addition recover against A's estate for the obligation owed to him
by A while living?
In answering this question the ultimate issue is whether the legacy is to be
deemed in satisfaction of A's obligation to B or whether it is to be deemed a sep-
arate bounty. If the legacy is regarded as a bounty then B may take his benefits
under A's will and also recover as a creditor against A's estate. However, if the
legacy is regarded as a satisfaction of A's obligation then B must elect between
prosecuting his claim against A's estate or taking under A's will. In the latter case
election necessarily follows because the testator, by intending to satisfy his obli-
25 Supra note 1.
2 G Supra note 13.
27 Scovill Mfg. Co. v. Skaggs Pay-Less Drug Stores, 45 Cal. 2d 881, 291 P.2d 936 (1955).
28 Id. at 885, 291 P.2d at 940.
29 Supra note 1.3 0 Supra note 2 1.
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gation by means of a legacy, has not given B a new and separate right but only an
alternative one.' The doctrine of election is not germane to this note, but it is
often intermingled with the problem of satisfaction.
It is a well-settled and undisputed rule of law that in interpreting wills the
central issue is always what was the intention of the testator.2 If the testator ex-
presses his intent that the legacy is to be deemed in satisfaction of his obligation
or if it is to be a bounty, then this intent will control. There is no need to apply
rules of construction or presumptions. Therefore, it is only where the testator fails
to clearly manifest his intent that recourse must be made to rules of law in deter-
mining the effect to be given bequests to creditors.
In 1714, the case of Talbot v. Duke of Shrewsbury3 laid down what is today
termed the general rule. It may be stated thusly: A legacy to a creditor of the tes-
tator, which legacy is equal to or greater in amount than the indebtedness due the
creditor, in the absence of anything to indicate a contrary intention, will be pre-
sumed to have been intended as a satisfaction of the obligation.4 Accordingly, B,
in the hypothetical fact situation above, cannot take as both legatee under A's
will and as creditor against A's estate. He could recover $100 as legatee or as
creditor, but not both.
However, this is not the end of the problem. While the general rule is an old
one and is still deemed to be in existence, it actually has been given little vigor as
a practical matter by most courts. In 1895 an English court of Chancery5 said in
speaking of the general rule:
"But no sooner was it established then learned judges of great eminence expressed
their disapproval of it, and invented ways to get out of it.G'
And in 1917 a Pennsylvania court said: 7
"The rule itself is not founded in reason, and often tends to defeat the bounty of tes-
tators, and able chancellors have thought it more agreeable to equity to construe a
testator to be both just and generous, where the interests of third parties are not
effected. And courts of justice will now lay hold of slight circumstances to get rid of
the rule.' 8
Consequently, because of the courts' dissatisfaction with the general rule along
with their disposition to evade its application through various exceptions, there
has developed what is sometimes spoken of as the modem rule,9 to wit: It must
appear from the will that the legacy was intended as satisfaction of the obligation,
and no presumption to that effect should be indulged. The modern rule is based on
the common sense approach that a testator best knows his intention and if he
intends satisfaction of an obligation by a legacy, he should and can easily so
state.10 Therefore, under the modern rule the legacy is deemed to be a bounty
170 Cal. 424, 12 Pac. 392 (1886).
2 ATxmSON, Wim.s § 146 (2d ed. 1953).
3 Prec. in Chan. 394, 24 Eng. Rep. 177.
4 In re Steinkraus' Estate, 233 Wis. 186, 288 N.W. 772 (1939).
5Re Horlock, 1 Ch. 516 (1895).
OId. at 518.
7 Bryne v. Bryne, 3 S. & R. 54 (Pa. 1917).
8 Id. at 60.
9 Hollister v. Old Colony Trust Co., 328 Mass. 225, 102 N.E.2d 770 (1952).
30 Lopez v. Lopez, 96 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 1957).
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rather than satisfaction. Accordingly, B, in the hypothetical above, can take as
both legatee under A's will and as creditor against A's estate.
Though the modern rule is gradually gaining acceptance with the courts, there
are still many jurisdictions which adhere to the old general rule." In these states
most of the courts have attempted to take the particular case out of the field of
the operation of the general rule through various exceptions. These exceptions
have been based on "slight circumstances" which the courts have used to show an
intent on the part of the testator, namely, that the testator intended the legacy
as a bounty and not as satisfaction. This approach to the problem of satisfaction
is quite similar to that followed by those courts which adhere to the modem rule.
They regard the situations which were exceptions to the old rule merely as part of
the facts and circumstances to be considered in determining the intention of the
testator.12
A few examples will suffice to illustrate what "slight circumstances" have been
held sufficient to create an exception to the general rule. It has been held that the
legacy is not to be presumed as satisfaction of the testator's obligation, by the
courts who follow the general rule, in the following instances: where the legacy is
given for an express purpose other than in payment of the obligation;13 where the
legacy is contingent; 14 where the bequest and the obligation are of a different
nature,15 as in the case where the obligation is a money debt and the bequest is in
the form of some other kind of property; where the will contains an express direc-
tion for the payment of the testator's debts. 16 Some courts have found an excep-
tion to the general rule where there is a difference in the time of payment,17 that is,
the legacy is to be paid upon probate of the will while the obligation may not be
due for some time in the future. Some courts look to the obligation itself to find
an intent on the part of the testator to give a bounty, as in the case where the debt
is unliquidated; 18 where the debt was contracted for after the making of the will; 19
where the obligation is owed by the testator in a trust or representative capacity.2
The most recent case in point is the Florida case of Lopez v. Lopez.2 The will
in this case bequeathed to the testator's widow certain properties, bank accounts,
and other items. It also provided for the prompt payment of all the testator's just
debts and payment of all inheritance taxes from the residuary estate. The residue
of the estate was left to the testator's three sons. The will did not indicate ex-
pressly or impliedly whether the testator intended that the provisions were to be
in lieu of or in satisfaction of any claims which the three sons might have against
his estate. The testator, while living, had acted as trustee for his sons in regard to
the income from certain stock and real property. While in such capacity he had
commingled, with his own assets, the trust funds received by him. The issue in the
11 Chaplin v. Lepley, 35 Ind. App. 511, 74 N.E. 546 (1905); Fowler v. Fowler, 3 P. WMs.
128, 24 Eng. Rep. 1098 (1735).1 2 ATxnsox, WiLLs § 138 (2d ed. 1953).
13.Re Huether's Will, 106 N.Y.S.2d 272 (Sur. Ct. 1951) ; Strong v. Williams, 12 Mass. 391
(1810).
14 Thompson v. Wilson, 82 Ill. App. 29 (1898).
15 Lopez v. Lopez, 96 So.2d 462 (Fla. 1957) ; 57 Am. J uR., Wills § 1575 (1948).
16 Re Hill's Estate, 23 Iowa 189, 102 N.E. 770 (1952).
17 Patterson Estate, 65 Pa. D. & C. 201 (1948).
18 Glover v. Patten, 165 U.S. 394 (1879).
19 Re Jewuske Estate, 85 N.Y.S.2d 476 (Sur. Ct. 1948).
20 Fetrow v. Krause, 61 Ill. App. 238 (1895).
21 96 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 1957).
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case was whether the testator by making his sons residuary legatees intended that
such legacies were to be in satisfaction of any claims they might have against his
estate. The court applied the modem rule, and the sons were not required to elect
between taking under the provisions of their father's will and maintaining their
separate action against his estate.
How has California dealt with this problem? The first case to consider it seems
to be Smith v. Furnish22 where the bequest of $300 was to Mrs. Smith "in con-
sideration and in payment for her kind care and attention during my last sick-
ness. ))2 The court held that the testator's intent was clearly manifested to the
effect that the bequest was to be in satisfaction of his obligation.
in 1918, in White v. Derring,24 a California court for the first time generally
discussed the problem of a devise to a creditor. The court quoted Lord Eldon in
La Sage v. Coussmaker:25
"A legacy was never deemed a satisfaction for a legal demand when that demand was
unliquidated at the time of the legacy given, nor where it was given before the time
when the demand accrued, or the debt was contracted, unless it was expressly said in
the will that it should be satisfied."28
The court distinguished the Smith case by saying that the testator's intent was
clear there while in this case it was not. The court went on to follow the rule laid
down in the New York case of Sheldon v. Sheldon,27 that:
"A legacy to a creditor is not to be deemed in satisfaction of his debt, unless so in-
tended by the testator: '28
The court further added that this intention must be expressed in unmistakable
language and appear from the will construed as a whole. It was held that the credi-
tor-legatee was not required to make an election between his rights as legatee and
creditor.
Between 1917 and 1950 there were no cases litigated on the problem of a leg-
acy to a creditor. Then in 1950 the most recent California cases in point were
decided. In the case of Merril v. Dustmanm the testatrix made a contract with
her housekeeper, whereby said testatrix promised to bequeath $1000 and certain
other properties to her housekeeper if the housekeeper would care for the testatrix
for the remainder of the testatrix's life. The testatrix in her will bequeathed to
the housekeeper precisely the same gift as she had promised. The court held that
the housekeeper could not recover against the testatrix's estate for the reasonable
value of her services since she had already accepted her benefits under the will.
The court said that the true rule is that a contract and a will are to be considered
together to ascertain whether the will constitutes performance of the contract.
In the case of Taylor v. George3" the will recited that no provision was made
for the testator's son because he was the named beneficiary of an insurance policy
on the testator's life in an amount sufficient for his needs so far as any contribu-
2 70 Cal. 424, 12 Pac. 392 (1886).
2 3 Id. at 427, 12 Pac. at 394.
238 Cal. App. 433, 177 Pac. 516 (1918).
25 170 Eng. Rep. 323 (1 Esp. 188) (1794).
261d. at 323.
= 133 N.Y. 1, 30 N.E. 730 (1892).2 8 Id. at 4, 30 N.E. at 730.
2a 97 Cal. App. 2d 473, 217 P.2d 99& (1950).
8034 Cal.2d 552, 212 P.2d 505 (1950).
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tion from the testator was concerned. The testator designated the insurance pro-
ceeds as the fund out of which his obligation under a divorce decree to support
his son was to be met. The proceeds of the insurance policy, of which the son was
the beneficiary, exceeded in amount the future support payments provided for by
the divorce decree. The court said:
"... The fact that at the testator's death the child [testator's son] was found to be the
beneficiary, when considered in the light of the terms of the will, affords a reasonable
basis for the conclusion that the provision for insurance was intended as fulfillment
of the obligation to support."3 1
In both these cases the attitude of the court in deciding the question of whether
a legacy to a creditor of the testator is to be deemed in satisfaction of his obliga-
tion apparently is that no presumption of intent to satisfy the obligation will be
indulged in. But rather that the court would look to all the facts and surrounding
circumstances and to the will as a whole, to determine the true intention. There-
fore, it seems that the prevailing rule in California today is the modern rule as
expressed in the White case.
Thus, the primary consideration, in cases dealing with the question of whether
a legacy to a creditor of the testator is to be deemed in satisfaction of the testator's
obligation or whether it is to be deemed as a separate bounty, is the intention of
the testator. It must be borne in mind that presumptions and rules of construction
are only devices to assist the court. The general rule that a legacy to a creditor
will be presumed to be in satisfaction of the testator's obligation has been stricken
with so many exceptions, and the courts have been so anxious to apply them, that
it would seem that the continued recognized existence of the rule would tend to
hinder rather than assist. The writer feels that the better view, as adopted by the
Florida court in the Lopez case, would be to drop the exception-riddled general
rule entirely in favor of the modern rule.
Robert Blumenthal
lId. at 558, 212 P.2d at 508.
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